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One of the most significant legal, social and economic problems in
wartime is the control of war profits. The United States and Canada
have approached this problem in different ways. This country, after
trying various other methods, is now relying upon the renegotiation of
war contracts to recapture such profits after they have become excessive,
while Canada has utilized a carefully planned procurement program to
prevent exorbitant profits from ever arising. In view of the current
discussions concerning the fairness and effectiveness of the American
plan of renegotiating war contracts, a comparison with Canadian
methods of controlling war profits and their results may well suggest
revisions in the procedures which could be adopted in this country.
The laws regulating war profits in the United States have been
profoundly influenced both by the situation in which the country found
itself at the time it commenced to arm for war and by the methods
used in World Var I. In the summer of x94o the collapse of France
and the threatened invasion of England forced the United States to
examine the state of its own defense preparations. As the gravity of
the international situation became more and more apparent there was a
demand for production of adequate war supplies at any cost. This
emphasis on production is entirely logical when time is so important and
when the Government's needs for munitions and supplies far outstrip
industry's capacity to produce them. It was only after the expansion of
war production was well under way that the Government began to reexamine the existing controls on costs and profits. Even today, after
more than two years of war economy, there are agencies of the Government urging maximum war production regardless of cost, while Congressional Committees are criticizing excessive costs and the Price
Adjustment Boards of the Army, Navy and Maritime Commission are
renegotiating large war contracts in order to reduce profits on war
business.
As far as the United States is concerned, the problem of war
profits is an old one. Every war in which this country has been engaged has provided opportunities for profiteering and it appears that
upon almost every occasion these opportunities have been taken advantA.B., 1932, LL.B., x935, Cornell University; member of the New York bar;
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tage of.' On many occasions Congress has passed laws to meet the
problem of war profiteering. It has authorized the fixing of prices; 2
it has placed a percentage limitation on profits; 3 it has recaptured high
profits through excess profits taxes; 4 and finally in April, 1942, it
established a procedure whereby all contracts involving large purchases
of war materials may be renegotiated if the profits are excessive.3
THE PROFIT MOTIVE IN WARTIME

While the United States, in World War I and in this war, has
attempted to prevent war profiteering, it has at the same time relied
primarily upon the profit motive to insure the adequate production of
munitions and supplies. Certainly most people have no quarrel with
the idea of utilizing the profit motive as an incentive to war production. But it is questionable if they have faced the fundamental fact
that profit can function as such an incentive only when those companies engaged in war production will receive relatively more profits
than other companies and relatively more profits than they would have
secured from non-war production. As long as this country relies on
the profit motive to induce maximum production of war supplies, war
profits are inevitable.
In wartime, of course, the emphasis upon low prices must give
way to the necessity of securing the rapid delivery of a large volume
of war supplies. For that reason the procurement officers of the
armed forces are naturally more interested in the rapid delivery of
munitions and supplies than in haggling over price or profits. In so
far as the profit motive secures rapid delivery, procurement officers
will be loath to see it eliminated. Because of its effect on production
procurement, officers will certainly be more anxious to see the profit incentive retained than are the members of Congress. The latter are apt
to be influenced both because public morale may suffer from scandals
over excessive war profits and because it is popular to be opposed to
war profits. In wartime it is natural to compare the sacrifices being
i. Hearingsbefore House Committee on Military Affairs, on H. R. .. and H. R.
5 2p3. 74 th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935) 59o-98. See also Interim Report of House Com21it t:e on Naval Affairs, pursuant to H. R. 62 (June 23, 1942) 44.
2. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. Law No. 421, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
(Jan. 3o, 1942) ; Pub. Law No. 729, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 2, 1942). (In World
War I prices were fixed by a process of negotiation and agreement between Govern-

ment and industry.)

Note, American Econonic Mobilizatlon (1942) 55 HARV. L Rxv.

427, 482.

3. g8 STAT. 50 (1934), 34 U. S. C. A. § 496 (Supp. 1941) ; 49 STAT. 1926 (1936),
34 U. S. C. A. § 496 (Supp. 1941); 49 SrAT. 1998-99 (1936), 46 U. S. C. A. §1155
(Supp. 194) ; 53 STAT. 560 (1938), 34 U. S. C. A. § 496 (Supp. 1941) ; 53 STAT. 591
(1939), 34 U. S. C. A. § 556 (Supp. ig4).
4. Revenue Acts of 192T, 1941, 1942.
5. Pub. Law No. 528, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (April 28. 1942) § 403. See also Stimson, Limitation of War Profits (x942) 91 U. oF PA. L. REv. 29.
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demanded of the public generally in the form of rationing and military
service with the granting to producers of war materials of a proportional
increased amount of income without realizing the effect that an undue
curtailment of profits might have upon the production of munitions and
supplies.
For over a hundred years the mere inequality of income has
repeatedly been the foundation of political movements in this country,
but the effect of such inequalities when produced by war are bound to
be more objectionable. As a result it is to be expected that democratic
governments will attempt to assert, and will assert, considerable control over war profits and perhaps even eliminate them entirely. Some
controls are undoubtedly necessary because whenever the mobilization
of a nation's resources to carry on a war is left to the laws of supply
and demand high war profits necessarily emerge. Whether these controls can at the same time be effective guarantees of maximum production of war materials is open to serious question.
Since procurement officers have at the most only a secondary interest in low profits a government must either carefully plan and supervise
the procurement of war supplies or else rely in a large measure upon
specially designed taxes and such other devices as renegotiation of war
contracts in order to control war profits. In some cases it may be
expected that the controls used may actually interfere with the effective
and efficient prosecution of the war. Perhaps from a Congressman's
point of view the necessity of maintaining public morale by preventing
discontent which might arise from high war profits is sufficient reason
to justify some interference with war production. It is hard to believe,
however, that such interference would be necessary if timely measures
had been adapted to limit war profits.
Reliance upon the profit-making motive in the early stages of preparing for war is an effective way of securing production of war materials. At that time it acts as an incentive to convert from peacetime to
war production, for it gives a premium to those changing from their
routine production program to the manufacture of munitions and war
supplies. After this conversion a company engaged in war work might
well be compelled by some form of public control to continue in that
type of work, without the presence of any economic incentive. The
elimination of all economic incentive, however, might well result in a
relaxation of efforts to increase production and to reduce costs unless
some powerful substitutes were devised.6 From the experience of the
United States in the last war and up to the present time in this war,
6. HcicKs. HIcKs & ROSTAS, THE TAXATION OF WAR WEALTH (London, 1941)
contains a complete discussion of the economics of war profits as an incentive to production.
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there is little to justify the belief that the controls which have been
advocated from time to time, would be effective in bringing about the
efficient prosecution of the war. The Dominion of Canada, however,
after initially approaching the problem of controlling war profits from
a different point of view than that followed in the United States, now
feels it can afford to eliminate virtually all of the profit-making motive.'
EARLY AMERICAN EFFORTS AT CONTROLLING WAR PROFITS

The control of profits on defense or war contracts in the United
States has a history going back at least to i896. In that year, after
claims had been made that armor plate manufacturers were making
exorbitant profits, the Naval Appropriations Act directed the Secretary
of Navy to report both on the actual cost of producing armor plate and
on a fair price for it. 8 After the Secretary made his report in January,
I897," the Naval Appropriations Act of that year limited the cost of
armor plate on any one contract to $30o per long ton. 10
Since this beginning in 1897 many different legislative efforts
have been made to control and limit war profits. The various methods
of controlling war profits fall within four classes: First, the use of
careful procurement procedures and cost controls; second, the limitation of profits by contractual or statutory provisions to a fixed percentage; third, the taxation of excess profits; and fourth, the renegotiation of war contracts.!' From an economic point of view much
can be said for the first and second alternatives as they tend to be more
effective in keeping down 'the costs to the Government than the other
two. It can readily be seen that none of these methods can guarantee
the rapid delivery of high quality munitions and supplies at a low cost
to the Government without their being carefully administered. Of
these four methods, the renegotiation of war contracts is the newest;
the statute controlling this procedure was passed in April, 1942.12 As
a matter of fact, if the other three methods had been administered suc7. Under the Canadian Tax Act of 1942 the only incentive left to reduce costs if
you are subject to the excess profits taxes depends on whether the 2o% return of excess
profits taxes after the war can be considered an effective incentive to operate at the
maximum efficient capacity. For details of the Act see 92 Canadian House of Commons Debates 39o et seq. (June 23, 1942).
8. 29 STAT. 379 (1896). As early as 1886 the Navy was directed to buy Americanmade armor if it could be secured at a "reasonable price". 24 STAT. 215 (1886).
9. 29 CowG. REc. 481 (1897).
10. 29 STAT. 665 (1897.
T1. Note, JVar-tjyme Con tracts and Control in Equity of "Inordinate" Profit
(1941) 9 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 693. This article urges the Equity Courts to solve this
problem by recognizing a fiduciary relationship. This theory was repudiated by the
majority in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U. S.289 (1942), but was
adopted in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent (Id. at 325, 326). See also its denial in
an analogous situation in United States v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 98 U. S. 569

(1878).
1.

See note 5 supra.
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cess fully there would have been no necessity for a law providing for the
renogiation of war contracts.
One of the factors which makes it so difficult to deal with the
problem of war profits is the conflicting idea of just how to measure
the extent of war profits. Most government representatives insist that
the existence of war profits should be measured before taxes, while
most businessmen maintain that there are never any profits until all
existing taxes have been paid. The Congress, of course, always has
the last word about federal taxes especially when its aim is to curtail
profits by taxes. This controversy has come out into the open in renegotiations of war profits with Price Adjustment Boards as these
Boards generally take the conventional government approach1 S
The way in which profits on sales to the government are normally
controlled is by the procurement methods employed. In peacetime most
products are -purchased by means of invitations for sealed bids.1 This
is a method which can only produce the lowest cost to the Government
when the capacity to produce (or a willingness to convert facilities)
exceeds the Government's demands. Even in peacetime, military
authorities have complained that procurement by means of competitive bidding caused unnecessary delays.1 5 As a result a series of laws
going back to 19oi permit the armed forces to make purchases without
advertising for sealed bids "in cases of emergencies".'
The art of
procuring the supplies to equip and maintain a modern army in wartime
is entirely different from peacetime procurement, because- for most
items there is an inadequate supply to meet the Government's demand.
In addition there is a premium upon rapid delivery, upon continued
increasing capacity and upon accurate adherence.to exacting specifications. Under these conditions it is not surprising thagt different procurement methods are employed.
Most of this country's wartime procurement .methods originated
from the experience had in World War I. After war was declared in
April, 1917, there was a period of initial confusion when both the
Army and Navy tried to use their peacetime procurement methods.
The various purchasing agents would advertise for sealed bids with
13. War Dept. Principles, Policy and Procedures to be followed in Renegotiation
(Price Adjustment Board, August io, 194a).
14- REv. STAT. § 3709 (1875), 41 U. S. C. A. § 5 (1940) ; 31 STAT. 90S (1902), 1O

U. S. C. A. § I2o

(940).

Is. N. Y. Times, January 21, 1940, p. 17, coL 3.
x6. 3I STAT. 905 (9oi), ro U. S. C. A. f I2ot (i94o).
See also 23 STAT. 110
(1884), io U. S. C. A. § 1364 (1940). In addition the purchase of certain items has
been permitted without advertisement. 20 STAT. 253 (1878); 27 STAT. 485 (1893);
28 STAT. 658 (1895); 34 STAT. 258 (1906); 34 STAT. 1193 (1907); 35 STAT. 125
(1908) ; 41 STAT. 967 (1920) ; 49 STAT. 1277 (z936) ; 53 STAT. 59z 1939) ; 53 STAT.

1000 (1939) ; 53 STAT. 1042 (1939).
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the result that purchases were being made by numerous separate agencies who actually competed with each other in the securing of supplies.17 The r'esult was an artificially enhanced demand which raised
prices and increased profits on many war contracts. Steps were soon
taken to alleviate much of this confusion by unifying the procurement
of supplies. The Council of National Defense, composed of six cabinet officers, set up three committees to deal with the problem.1 8 The
most important of these was the General Munitions Board composed
of 24 representatives of the Army, Navy and the public. This Board
supervised most of the military and naval purchases. 19 The other
two had more restricted authority. Thus, the Committee on Supplies
dealt with the procurement of clothing, equipment and subsistence,
while the Committee on Raw Materials, Minerals and Metals allocated
these necessities. 20 These three committees were supplanted in July,
1917, by the War Industries Board which was given broad power to
control industry. This Board largely straightened out the problem of
purchasing and producing war materials.2 1
Even though the procurement of war supplies was controlled by
one central body it was found that the procurement of munitions and
supplies by advertising for competitive bids had to be discontinued.
At best it was a slow and cumbersome method and, in addition, as labor
and production costs spiralled higher and higher many companies were
unwilling to submit bids on a fixed-price basis. The companies which
refused to bid pointed out that the government required bids to be
submitted on a fixed-price basis, which was sheer suicide in the face of
rapidly rising costs. The dangers to the producers under fixed-price
contracts came to be recognized by the War Department. 2 2 As a result,
cost-plus contracts were devised to protect industry and they soon
largely supplanted fixed-price contracts. 23 These cost-plus contracts
were of two types: cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost and cost-plus-a-fixedfee. The possibilities of an unscrupulous company abusing the cost17. GRASKE, TIlE LAW OF GOVERNMENT DEFENSE CONTRACTS (941)

6-8.

T. N.

E. C. Monograph i9, Government Purchasing (1940) 43 et seq.
18. GRASEF, op. cit. supra note 17, at 8-9. The National Defense Council was
set up under 39 STAT. 166 (i916) with authority to set up subordinate boards and
agencies.
i9. Garrett, Government Control over Prices,War Industries Board Price Bulletin No. 3 (1920) 19.
20. C. ARKSON, I-NDUSTIpAL A mEncA IN T3E WORLD INrAR (1923) 35.
21. GRASKE, op. cit. jupra note 17, at o-2.
22. Report of Chief of Construction Division, WAR DEPARTMENT ANNUAL REPORT
(1919) 4147, where it is stated, "Obviously no sane man would bid on a lump-sum contract under such conditions, unless perchance he should treat the matter as a pure
gamble and include an excessive margin in his proposal for unforeseen contingencies."
Quoted with approval in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co, 315 U. S. 289, 302

(942).

23. GRAsKE, op. cit. supra note 17, at x7, I8.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

200

2
plus-a-percentage-of-cost contract soon led to its disfavor. ' During
5
this war the use of this type of contract is prohibited by law.'
The cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract was quite widely used in the
last war. It was soon realized, however, that this contract was not a
panacea to the problem of low-cost procurement of supplies. Its chief
drawback was that it failed to provide any incentive to the producer to
increase the efficiency of operation either by shortening the production
time, by saving vital materials, or by reducing those costs to be paid by
the Government. 2 ' This lack of incentive led to a variation of the
cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract by which a bonus was given for savings
in cost. While this form of contract included an incentive to reduce
costs it also encouraged unscrupulous manufacturers artificially to
inflate their estimates of cost. 27 The large profiis of some companies
under this type of contract was severely criticized after the war.2 s In
fact it was a controversy over such a bonus contract which was before
the Supreme Court in the recent Betldehem Steel case.29
During the last war, both the Army and the Navy tried to limit
profits on contracts. Thus, the Navy adopted a policy of trying to have
its contracts allow no more than 10 per cent. of the actual cost as
profits.' 0 The War Department placed a ceiling of IO per cent. profit
on cost-plus contracts for the construction of cantonments."1 The percentage decreased as the size of the project increased, the lower limit
being 5 per cent. These limitations were not imposed by statute and no
effort was made to recapture profits in excess of these amounts.
Another approach to the control of war profits was the fixing of
prices on the sale of certain commodities. A study of what was a "fair
and just price" for such commodities was begun under the General
Munitions Board early in the war and prices were fixed as a result.
Whenever a flat price could not be agreed upon, the Board decided to
authorize the payment of actual-cost plus a 1o per cent. profit in order
to hasten deliveries."2 When this function was taken over by the War
24. Gi.sKF, op. cit. supra note 17, at x8; REPORT TO TE AroRNEY GENER. ox
134, reprinted as Appendix A, 57 CONG. Rac. 883-914
in the War Department-Camps, H. R. Rap. No. 816, 66th
at 9o6 (I918) ; Expenditures
49-53-.
(1x18)
Cong, 2d Sess.
25. 54 STAT. 676 (1940) ; 54 STAT. 712 (1940).
THE AiRcRAFT INQUIRY (x918)

26. Hearings before House Committee on Military Affairs on H. R. 3 and H. R.
5293, 74th Cong, tst Sess. (935), especially at 604 et seq.; T. N. E. C. Monograph
19, Government Purchasing (1940) 50-54; GRAsKE, op. cit. supra note 17, at 121 et
seq. 27. Cf. United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U. S. 289
(1942).
28. Such a contract is permitted under a ruling by the Comptroller General
GRAsKE, op. cit. supra note 17, at 135-136.

29. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U. S. 289 (1942).
30. REP. SEc'Y NAVY (917) 33; Id.(x98) 685; Id. (igxg) 572-576; Id. (x920)

147-8.:

8
31. REP. SEeY WAR (1917) Vol. :, p.'2 ; Id. (1918) Vol. t, p. 1319; Id. (1919)

4138-42.

See also CROWVELL, Gov

,r-NI

WAR CoNTRAcTs (192o) 8S.

32- T. N. E. C. Monograph x9. (7ozernment Purchasing (1940) 51.
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Industries Board, it fixed prices through its Price Fixing Committee.
In general, these prices were fixed at fairly high levels so that efficient
83
producers were able to make large profits.
It seems that the National Defense Act of 1916 could have been
used to control profits in World War I. 4 Under this Act the President, in case of war, had the power to purchase munitions and supplies provided the compensation to be paid for the "products or material, or as rental for use of any manufacturing plant while used by the
United States, shall be fair and just." The ultimate question of the
fairness of prices under this statute could be taken to the courts if the
manufacturer was dissatisfied. This power was rarely exercised."5
The War Industries Board, purporting to act under this Act and other
statutes, 8 did enter into agreements with industries which fixed profits
on some items.8 1 In one or two instances the courts entertained suits
by the United States under these statutes and the industry agreements
to recover excessive profits.$$
The control of war profits in World War I was largely left, however, to the tax laws. President Wilson in a joint session of Congress
on May 27, 1918, urged a new tax bill using these words:
"The profiteering that cannot be got at by the restraints of conscience and love of country can be got at by Taxation. -There is
such profiteering now and the information with regard to it is
available and indisputable." "3
Congress immediately began to investigate profiteering.

Early in

June a resolution proposed by Senator Borah directed the Treasury
to submit information on profiteering, including a list of all corporations which earned in excess of 15 per cent. on their capital stock
for the year 1917, and the 1916 earnings for the same companies.4 0
On June IO, a second Borah resolution was passed, directing the
Federal Trade Commission to report on profiteering.4 1 The Com-

mission concluded in its report on June 29, 1918, that profiteering
existed in many lines.42 Subsequently the Commission submitted specific reports on such industries as the copper industry.43 In July the
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

38.

Gordin,
39.

Id. at 51,

s2.

39 STAT. 213 (r9i6), So U. S. C. A. § 8o (x98).
GRASKE, op. Cit. sPpra note t7, at 19.
39 STAT. 649 (z916).
Note, American Economic Mobiization (1942) 55 Hav. L. REv. 427, 482.
United States v. Powers, 274 Fed. 131 (%V. D. Mich. 1921) ; United States v.
287 Fed. 565 (S. D. Ohio, 1922).
56 CoNG. REC. 7115 (1918).

40. Id. at 7231, 7420.

41. Id. at 7558.
42. Profiteering,S. Doc. No. 248, 56 CoNG. REC. 8458-62 (x918).

See also Hear-

ings Before House Committee on Military Affairs on H. R. 3 and H. R. 5293, 74th
Cong., ist Sess. (1935) 604 et seq.
43. Cost Reports of the Federal Trade Commission-Copper, June 30, 1919.
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Treasury submitted its report showing a high percentage of profits and
large salaries. 4' After making these factual inquiries into the extent
of war profiteering Congress followed President Wilson's program.
Higher taxes were enacted and the government relied primarily upon
the excess profits taxes to control war profits. These taxes culminated
in a levy of 8o per cent.".
AMERICA BEGINS TO PLAN AFTER WORLD WAR I

The methods employed during World War I resulted in much
criticism. Although many of the reports on the profits by producers
of munitions and war supplies may properly be dismissed as either
witch-hunts or misguided zeal, certainly there is adequate ground for
concluding that the problem of controlling war profits was not solved. 4"
This situation led to the passage of the National Defense Act of 1920,
which directed the Assistant Secretary of War to make "adequate provision for the mobilization of material and industrial organizations
essential to wartime needs". 47 This was the beginning of planning
for procurement for the present war. -Since that time the War Department has been working on what it characterized as the development of
41..
. an adequate, coordinated and integrated program of wartime procurement adapted to the American system of government
and industry, which will function effectively in case of war." 49
In many respects this planning was quite thorough. A War Policies
Commission was set up to study the last war and to make recommendations concerning changes in procurement procedure.49 But most of this
peacetime planning was directed at providing for the orderly procurement of war supplies. It was designed to reduce the possibilities of
government procurement officers forcing up prices by competing with
each other.5 0 While all of this planning would provide for the orderly
procurement of war supplies, little of it was devoted specifically to the
more difficult job of designing methods to insure reasonable prices and
to prevent excessive war profits. The War Policies Commission made
one contribution in this direction by recommending that a constitutional
amendment be passed to eliminate all doubt as to the power of Congress
to prevent war profiteering. 51 It also recommended that in time of war
56 CONG. RF. 8671 (x9x8).
39 STAT. 1000 (1917) ; 40 STAT. 302 (1917) ; A2 STAT. 271 (1921).
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U. S. 289 (1942).
41 STAT. 764, 765 (919o).
48. REP. SEC'Y WAR (1938) 27.
49- Report of War Policies Commission, H. R. Doc. No. 163, 72d Cong., tst Sess.
('93').
44.
45.
46.
47.

so. T. N. E. C. Monograph

19, Government Purchasing (194o) 54-63.
5r. Report of War Policies Commission, H. R. Doc. No. 264, 72d Cong., 1st Sm.
(1932) 3; REP. SEc'y ,VAR(r932) 303.
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individuals and corporations be taxed 95 per cent. of all the income
above the previous 3 .year average.
One concrete result of this planning was the establishment of the
Army and Navy Munitions Board to coordinate procurement by these
two services. 52 Another result was the decision to abandon competitive bidding for the procurement of military supplies in time of war.5 3
General Douglas MacArthur, former Chief of Staff, stated before the
War Policies Commission: "We plan to base wartime procurement
upon allocation rather than upon the competitive-bidding standard prescribed in peace". 54 He further contended that "Prices will be determined by negotiation, controlled by the knowledge obtained in peacetime planning, of the items that make up costs and by all information
that can be collected by the government." 53 Another result was the
establishment of the Army Industrial College to train military men in
the procurement field. 5 '
It is only natural that the-emphasis on efficiency and speed in wartime procurement necessitates laying aside, at least temporarily, the
practice of securing competitive bids. Congress has, since the beginning of the war, given broad authority to negotiate contracts without
If this practice of negoadvertising and without competitive bids.5
tiating contracts is to take the place of competitive bidding, then a
careful system of cost accounting and price determination is necessary
to furnish some check on inflationary tendencies, which are controlled
in peacetime, in part at least, by competitive bidding. As competitive
bids are asked on only a small portion of the Government's current
purchases some attentioi :1s necessary to see what has been developed
in its place.
Despite this country's experience in the last war, no revolutionary
changes have been made in the procurement methods now in use. In
fact there is a similarity in the development of current procurement
techniques with the evolution which took place in 1917 and 1918. Generally speaking the same types of contracts are in use today which were
found to be ineffective in controlling profits in World War I. Thus, at
the present time, there are two principal types of negotiated contracts,
the fixed-price contract and the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract. While
the fixed-price contract is the favorite form of contract, cost-plus-a52. This Board wams created by joint order of the Secretaries of War and the Navy
in 1922. See REI. SEC'Y WAR (1938) 24.
53. Report of the War Policies Commission, H. R. Doc. No. i63, .72d Cong, 1st
Sess. (1931) 363; REP. SEe'Y WAR (1932) 304.
54. Report of the War Policies Commission, loc. di. supra note 53, at 363.
55. Id. at 364. See
also H. R. Doc. No. 264, 72d Cong., ist Sess. (1932) 3.
T
56. REP. Sc'y W\
AR (1931) 26; Id. (1934) 28; Id. (1939) 2o.
57. 54 STAT. 714 (1940) ; 54 STAT. 676 (940) ; 54 STAT. 297 (940) ; 54 STAT.
377 (940) ; 54 STAT. 875 (194o) ; 54 STAT. 60o (1940) ; Pub. Law No. 139, 77th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (June 30, 1941).
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fixed-fee contracts are employed in a great many situations such as
where the source of production is limited and where the jobs are large
jobs and speed is essential. The fixed-price contract, since it guarantees
to the manufacturer as his profit the difference between the fixed-price
and his actual cost, contains an incentive to the manufacturer to keep
his cost of production as low as possible. In face of rising prices, and
other costs, it has been necessary to insert in fixed-price contracts,
escalator clauses which provide for reimbursing the contractor in the
event of substantial increases in the price of materials or in the cost of
labor. Since, under the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract, the Government
will reimburse the manufacturer for most items of direct cost there is
no pressure upon the manufacturer to keep down costs. The only difference from the last war in the types of contracts employed is the
elimination of the cost-plus-a-percentage contract.
The extensive use of the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts, in spite
of the disappointing experience the United States had with them in the
last war, is surprising. This is especially true because the experience
of the British Government with the use of cost-plus contracts in this
war was quite similar to America's experience in the last war. s '
Moreover, Congressional Committees have recommended that a study
be made of alternate methods for contracts to displace the cost-plus-afixed-fee contract. 5 ' These Committees seem to favor fixed-price contracts with escalator clauses whereby the agreed price is changed in
definite relation to changes in wage rates and basic commodity prices.
The War Department in using these cost-plus contracts has taken the
position that they were necessary to avoid serious delays.60
During the last war, one way in which the costs to the Government were increased was by the existence of contingent fee brokers.41
This increase in cost to the Government has been lessened during the
58. REPORT OF THE SELEcT COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL EXPENDITURES

(LondoN

1941). This Committee concluded that the best type of contract was the fixed-price
cdntract, and that the cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost was the worst. This report
comes out strongly for the fixed-price contracts with the price based upon technical
costing studies. The Committee, in reference to the problem of controlling war profits,
concluded that profits should be related to amount of capital employed and that some
degree of uniformity was desirable in so far as practicable.' The Committee favored
a fixed rate to cover each industry, with some flexibility retained to offer special incentives for special effort.
59. Ititerim Report.of House Committee on Military Affairs; pursuant to H. R.
z62, 77th Cong., ist Sess. (1941) 14-6. See also Interim Report of House Committee
on Naval Affairs, pursuant to H. R. .6z, 7.7th Cong., ist Sess. (June 23, 1942) 5, 43.
6o. REP. SEc'Y WAR C0941) 29. . "In-order to avoid serious delays that would be
involved by use of lump-sum contracts, resort has been made to the use of the cost-plusa-fixed-fee form of contract in a number of cases ...
" Such contracts could be used
only if authorized by the Assistant Secretary of War.
REP. SEc'y NAvy (1941) 39 says the Navy has used competitive bids except when
their use "would be detrimental to the interests of the Government".
61.

CRowELr,

GOVERNMENT WAR CONTRAS

(1920)
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62
present war by covenants in contracts against contingent broker fees.
There is also pending in Congress, a bill passed by the House es and
now in committee in the Senate, prohibiting the payment of contingent
fees to contract brokers. The Senate committee has revised this bill so
as to permit some contingent fees provided that the purchasing officer
finds that those fees are not "in excess of the amount determined to be
reasonable". 64 The Senate bill also provides for a withholding of payments to the seller if such fees are determined to be unreasonable or
excessive.
PROFIT LIMITATION TO A STATUTORY PERCENTAGE

While no significant changes have been made in procurement
methods employed at the close of World War I, some statutes have
been passed to control war profits by statutory limitations on profits.
The first such law was passed in 1934. At that time President
Roosevelt was asking Congress to appropriate money to build up
the Navy to Treaty strength. 5 This request brought out a storm of
criticism. Senator Borah made his famous "Take the Profit out of
War" speech 66 and Senator Nye began work on his "Munitions Investigation". 67 The country was deluged with the stories of exorbitant
profits made in \Vorld War I. It is not surprising that when Congress
did authorize the naval construction program in 1934, the Vinson Act
limited profits to be realized by the builders of the new warships."8
This law limited the profits on these naval construction contracts to
io per cent. of the contract price, and it required each contract to contain a provision binding the contractor to pay back to the Treasury all
profit "in excess of io per centum of the total contract price." The
books of contractors were to be open to inspection and audit. The
method of ascertaining the amount of "excess profit" was to be the
subject of a joint order by the Secretaries of the Treasury and Navy."9
C. H. War Law Serv. 122,60l52, 22,603.33, 22,610.24, 22,628.20 (1942).
63. H. R. 7304, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., passed by the House July 2o, 1942.
64. H. R. 7304, 77th Cong, 2d Sess., as amended August x2, 1942.
65. 78 Co4G. R.m x6or (x934).
66. 78 CONG. Rr.E. 3688 et seq. (1934). Senator Borah's theme was (p. 3689):
"It is not alone that they [munitions makers) are engaged even at a reasonable profit
in an enterprise which would be a matter in itself sufficiently serious for consideration,
but the exorbitant profits and gains which they make in furnishing instruments to
maim, to destroy their fellow men, is something almost unbelievable."
67. Hearitgs before a Special Senate Committee to investigate the Munitions in62. 2 C.

dustry began on Sept. 4, x934, pursuant to S. Res. 260, 73d Cong. (1934).
68. 48 STAT. 505 (z934), 34 U. S. C. A. §§ 496-497 (Supp. 1941).

69. The origin'l order was issued in May, z934. 26 Code of Federal Regulations
§§ 5.0 to 5.2o; Treasury Decision 4434, amended January 6, 1937, by T. D. 4723, 2 F.

R. 43, and again September ig, 1938, T. D. 4861, 3 F. R. 2279. It was in the amend-

ment that there appeared the first positive reference to unreasonable compensation of
executives and directors.
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In 1936 to make the Vinson Act more workable it was amended.7'
One of the new provisions permitted the offsetting of losses on one
contract against profits on another. This was accomplished by extending the 1O per cent. profit limitation to the aggregate contract prices of
all contracts completed during each taxable year. In addition the
amendment permitted the offsetting of net losses for one taxable year
against net profits during the succeeding taxable year. In the same
year the Merchant Marine Act extended this io per cent. limitation on
profits to ships built for the Maritime Commission."1
The Merchant Marine Act was the first of these profit limitation
statutes which contained any specific provisions concerning the meaning
of profit and allowable costs. While the Act directed the Commission
to determine what constituted profit, it did have specific provisions as to
certain matters. For example it provided "that in computing such
profits no salary of more than $25,000 per year to any individual shall
be considered as part of the cost of building such ship." It also directed
the Commission to "scrutinize construction costs, and overhead expenses to determine" whether they were "fair, just and not in excess
of a reasonable market price".
Prior to 1939 the limitation of profits had not been extended to
Army contracts. In that year a limitation was put on the profits
derived from military aircraft. 2 The same statute amended the Vinson Act so that the io per cent. limitation on profits applied only to
naval vessels and provided for a maximum of 12 per cent. profit on
contracts for military or naval aircraft. Later in 1939 the Navy was
given power to enter into defense contracts on a cost-plus-a-fixed-fe
basis with the fee limited to 1o per cent. of the cost of the contract
exclusive of the fixed fee.1 3 All of these statutes were actually peacetime procurement laws. The country was not yet preparing for war.
The Act of June 28, 194o, coming as it did after the fall of the
Low Countries and France, is really the beginning of the war legislation in the United States.74 This Act authorized the negotiation of
contracts for the construction and repair of naval aircraft and vessels
without competitive bids and it reduced the profit limitation in the Vinson Act for their procurement to 8 per cent. of the total contract price
or 8.7 per cent. of the cost of performing the contract.- Provision was
also made to extend the provisions of this Act to subcontractors, and to
permit the Secretary of the Navy to take over and operate any necessary plant or facility wherever its use and operation could not be guar70. 49 STAT. 1926 (1936), 34 U. S. C. A. §496 (Supp. 1941).
71. 49 STAT. i998-99 (936), 46 U. S. C. A. § z55 (b) (194o).
72. 53 STAT. 560 (1939), 34 U. S. C. A. §496 (1940).
73. 53 STAT. 591 (1939)
74. 54 STAT. 676 (194o), 41 U. S. C. A. note preceding § x (Supp. x94').
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anteed by a contract with its owners. While this Act authorized the
use of the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee type of contract it prohibited the use of
cost-plus-a-tkrcentage-of-cost contracts. The War Department was
given power to negotiate similar contracts in July, I94o.73 In the case
of the War Department the amounts of the fees, however, on most of
the War Department's cost-plus contracts were not limited until March,
1942.76 Late in x94o, however, the fees on public works on Army
camps were restricted to 6 per cent.7 7 In March, 1942, the fees were
set at 7 per centum of the estimated reimbursable cost on most War
Department contracts, 8 and in June the fees on work at Army camps
were again limited to 6 per cent.79 The law of July 2, i94o,80 did prohibit the War Department from entering into cost-plus-a-percentage-ofcost contracts.
PROFIT LIMITATION BY ExcEss PROFITS TAXES

The days of profit control by a percentage limitation were numbered. On September 9, i94o, the operation of the profit limitation
features of the Act of June 28, i94o,was restricted to contracts for the
construction of naval vessels.8 1 This in effect suspended its operation
on contracts for naval and military aircraft. In October, 1940, the
profit limitation statutes applicable to all military and naval and most
merchant marine contracts and subcontracts were suspended by the Second Revenue Act of 1940, whenever the contracts or subcontracts were
subject to the excess profits tax. 2 One effect of this Act was to
suspend certain Treasury7 Decisions relating to cost determinations on
contracts for naval vessels and military and naval aircraft. 83 These
specific profit limitations -were suspended in the hope of securing a more
equitable and uniform handling of all war contracts.8 4 These limitations may be revived, however, by Presidential proclamation or a
joint resolution of the two Houses of Congress.
With the suspension of these profit limitation provisions, the
Revenue Acts became the chief limitation on war profits. These Acts
have successively increased the excess profit tax rates. The Second
75. 54 STAT. 712-714 (1940). See also 41 U. S.C. A. note preceding § I (Supp.
1941), and 54 STAT. 883 (1940).
76. Pub. Law No. 507, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 27, x942).
77. 54 STAT. 873; 54 STAT. 968 (940).

78. Pub.Law No.507, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 27, 1942).
79. Pub. Law No.580, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 5,i%2).
So. 54 STAT.713 (1940), 41 U. S. C. A. note preceding § i (Supp. 1941).
81. 54 STAT. 883 (1940), 41 U. S.C.A. note preceding §i (Supp. 1941).
82. 54 STAT. 1003 (1940), 34 U. S. C. A. §496a (Supp. 194i).

.

83. T. D. 5034, 6 FED. REo. 669 (94) suspended T. D. 4906, 4909 and 50o0.
84. REPORT OF WAYS AND MEANS CO.MMITEF ON SECOND R'E.VEUE Acr OF 194o,

76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940). It stated that uniformity in treatment would be achieved
for all abnormal profits by the suspension of the Vinson-Trammell Act.
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Revenue Act of 1940 operated to tax 25 to 50 per cent. of all earningsin excess of peacetime earnings.8 5 Later, by the Revenue Act of 1941,
these limitations were increased by taxing 35 to 6o per cent. 8 6 of such
added earnings. The 1942 Revenue Act has increased these taxes to
9o per cent. with a io per cent. post war credit. 87 The other limitation
which now affects war contracts is the Renogiation Statute.86
Although the excess profits tax laws were intended to supersede the
laws limiting profits to a specific percentage, in 1942 profit limitation
provisions began to reappear in various statutes. The Second War
Powers Act 89 in March, 1942, limited the profits on all fixed-fee contracts of the War Department to 7 per cent. of the estimated cost of the
contract exclusive of the fee to be paid to the contractor. Fixed-fee
contracts of the Navy negotiated under this Act are subject to the same
limitation. In June, 1942, a limitation of profit to 6 per cent. of the
estimated cost on fixed-fee contracts for public works at military posts
was imposed.90
PROFIT LIMITATION BY RENEGOTIATION OF CONTRACTS

Nineteen forty-two witnessed the birth of a new method of controlling war profits. Evidence had been accumulating late in 1941 that
neither high excess profits taxes nor the limitation of profits to a specific
percentage had not been effective in eliminating exorbitant war profits.
As a result late in 1941 attention began to be turned to the renegotiation of war contracts as a method of controlling war profits. At first
these activities were purely voluntary. The First War Powers Act had
authorized the President to allow any department to renegotiate existing and future war contracts whenever the department.believed it would
facilitate the prosecution of the war. 9 1 While this law authorized
the renegotiation of war contracts, it did not authorize such renegotiation for the purpose of curtailing war profits. In December, 1941,
pursuant to this Act, President Roosevelt authorized the Army, Navy
and Maritime Commission to renegotiate their contracts. 2
During the winter and spring of 1942 Congress and Congressional
Committees began to examine the possibilities of controlling war profits
by renegotiation. Thus, the House Naval Affairs Committee in January, 1942, recommended that contracts showing excessive profits be
85. 2d Revenue Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 975, 26 U. S. C. A. § 710 (Supp. 1?41).

Revenue Act of 194', 55 STAT. .687, 26 U. S. C. A. § 2o (Supp. z4i).
Revenue Act of x942, Title 11.
Pub. Law No. 528, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (April 28, z942) §403.
Pub. Law No. 507, 77th Cong, 2d Sess. (March 27, z942).
Pub. Law No. 580, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (June , '942).
91. Pub. Law No. 354, 77th Cong., st Sess. (December xS, x94t).
92. Executive Order 9ooi (Dec. 27, 194), 6 FED. REG. 6787 (Dec. 3q, x94t).
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
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renegotiated to reduce the huge profits being realized on many of
them. 93

While this trend toward the compulsory renegotiation of war contracts was developing, the Supreme Court of the United States handed
down its decision in the Bethlehem Steel case.9 4 In that case the Court
had before it .the question of profits which arose out of the first World
War. After sustaining the right of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation
to the bonus for savings called for in its cost-plus contract, Mr. Justice
Black pointed out that Congress had taken various steps to regulate and
curtail war profits. The Supreme Court, sitting in equity, had no
power, said the Justice, to vary the provisions of a contract which
provided for large war profits. Said Mr. Justice Black: 9"
"If the executive is in need of additional laws by which to protect
the nation against war profiteering the Constitution has given to
Congress, not to this court, the power to make them."
Soon after this decision was handed down Congress in the Second
War Powers Act began to lay the ground work for the renegotiation
of contracts. 9 6 Pursuant to that Act the President, on April 8,
1942, issued an order designating officers in the WPB, the Army,
Navy, Treasury, RFC and the Maritime Commission to inspect the
books and plants of all companies with a large volume of war contracts
9
to determine whether they had accumulated unreasonable profits. T
Neither the Second War Powers Act nor the President's order gave
these officers any power to bring about a reduction in war profits.
Under this order, the Army, Navy and Maritime Commission established cost analysis sections and Price Adjustment Boards.9 ' These
cost analysis sections were to conduct gcneral surveys of profits and
costs of the holders of war contracts, and to act as fact finding agencies for the Price Adjustment Boards. These Boards were to assist
the various departments in securing voluntary adjustments as refunds
in instances where costs and profits were excessive for any reason.
Although renegotiation was on a voluntary basis, 99 a large volume of
refunds were made. 10 0
93. REPoRT OF HousE CoMmirrEE oz; NAVAL AFFAIRS PURSUANT TO H. R. 162
(Jan. 2o, x942) 1o4.
94. United States v. Bethlehem Stel Corp., 315 U. S. 289 (1942). See Note
(942) 51 YALE L J. 85S.

95. 315 U. S. 309.
96. Pub. Law No. 507, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 27; 1942).
97. Executive Order 9127 (April io, 1942), 7 FED. REG. 2753 (April ix, x942).
9-. W. P. B. Release No. 1017 (April 3o, 1942); 0. W. I. Release No. x63 (July

24, 1942).

99. Supplemental Report, House Comrmittee on Naval Affairs, pursuant to H. R.
i62 (July 22. 1942) 26-32, reported refunds of $533, 1$958, W887. Preliminary Report
House Naval Affairs Committee pursuant to H. R. 162 (Ja. 20, 1942) 0l-1O4.
ioo. PreiminaryReport of House Committee on Naval Affairs pursuant to H. R.
16- (June 23. 1942) 11; Id. (July 22, 1942) 26-32.
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The whole question of additional controls over war profits was
precipitated by the introduction of the Smith-Vinson Bill. The bill
was a hybrid measure coupling a 6 per cent. limitation of profits on
war contracts, with a relaxation of the Wages and Hours Law, so as to
terminate overtime payments below a 48-hour week.'01 When hearings on the Smith-Vinson Bill were in progress during March, 1942, a
procession of Administration leaders appeared opposing both phases of
the bill. 10 2 On March 19 and 20, Robert Patterson, Under-Secretary
of War, denounced the bill as not "practicable" and stated that the
Excess Profits Tax was the only statute necessary for wartime profit
limitation.10 3 On March 24, Donald Nelson claimed that the SmithVinson Bill was a faulty yardstick which would force contractors to
demand the more expensive cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts. 104 He too
favored the excess profits tax as the method to be used in recapturing
excessive war-profits. On March 25, Randolph Paul, representing the
Treasury Department, strongly opposed the bil 1 0 51
The Administration seems to have opposed any rigid limitation of
profits to a certain percentage of "cost" upon the belief that such yardsticks were not only cumbersome to administer, but they failed to
achieve the objective of limiting war profits to reasonable amounts.
In fact this plan seemed on the one hand to work hardships on companies with high capitalization thereby discouraging the production of
war materials, and on the other hand it often allowed profits that were
utterly excessive as in the case where a contractor had a huge annual
gross and very small invested capital.
While Administration leaders were opposed to the passage of a
uniform percentage limitation on war profits, they proposed no substitute. Congress, however, was interested in following Mr. Justice
Black's suggestion of additional legislation to control war profits.'"
One substitute was offered in the form of an amendment to the House
Bill. This provided for the renegotiation of war contracts.10 1 This
amendment never came to a vote for it was withdrawn, and on March
ioi. H. R. 6790, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
zo2.
Vall Street J., March 21, z942, p. 3.
1o3. Vall Street J., March 20, x942, p. x.
104. Vall Street J., March 25, 1942, p. 1.
1o5. Wall Street J., March 26, 1942, p. 4.

In fact, other members of the Administration, including Navy Secretary Knox,
and Lt.-Gen. Somervell, did during April and May, 1942, oppose a flat limitation on
profits.
xo6. 88 CONG. REc., April 2, r942, at 3390.
107. .88 CoNG. REc., March 28, 1942, at 323o. This clause provided: "Sec. 402-A.
No part of any appropriation contained in this act shall be available to pay that portion
of a'cpntcact for construction of any character and/or procurement of material and
supplies, for either the Military or Naval Establishments, designated as 'final payment'
until the contractor sball have filed with the procuring agency a certificate of costs and
an agreement for renegotiation and reimbursement satisfactory to the Secretary of War
or the Secretary of the Navy as the case may be." (See also p. 3228.)
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28, x942,by a vote of 7o to 8, the House added to the Sixth Supplemental Defense Appropriations Bill a rider limiting profits on the fund
subject to that bill to 6 per cent. of the cost of each contract.L '
In the Senate the Administration rallied its forces around Senator
George, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, in opposing the
House rider, but early in April it appeared that there were fmany senators who favored some additional limitation on war profits. This
pressure in the Senate was so great that the Senate Finance Committee
modified the house rider only to the extent that it limited the rate of
profit to a lower per cent of the cost on the larger contracts.1 0 ' The
Administration leaders in the Senate, however, on April 6th, amended
the bill on the Senate floor so that it authorized and directed the heads
of the Navy, Army and Maritime Commisgion to renegotiate all contracts over $iooooo in value where profits were or threatened to be
"excessive". 2 10 The amendment also eliminated the Committee's 6
per cent limitation on war profits.
The Sixth National Defense Appropriations Act as finally passed
directed the Army, Navy and Maritime Commission to renegotiate
existing and future contracts whenever in their opinion "excessive
profits" have been or are likely to be realized."'1 The statute provides
inpart:
"The Secretary of each Department is authorized and directed, whenever in his opinion excessive profits have been realized, or are likely to be realized, from any contract with such
Department or from any subcontract thereunder, (i) to require
the contractor or subcontractor to renegotiate the contract price,
(2) to withhold from the contractor or subcontractor any amount
of the contract price which is found as a result of such renegotiation to represent' excessive profits, and (3) in case any amount
of the contract price found as a result of such renegotiation to
represent excessive profits shall have been paid to the contractor
or subcontractor, to recover such amount from such contractor."
It also provided that all future war contracts should have a clause permitting their renegotiation at any time.
From this legislative history it is difficult to determine whether
the Administration really wanted to have this renegotiation procedure
formalized by statute. It is true that the renegotiation of contracts
was backed by the Administration, but it does not appear to have been
xoS. 8 CoNG. REc., March 8, 1942, at 3230-31.

109L KS CONG. REc, April 6, 1942, at 3441-42.
iio. SS Co-,G. RFC., April 6. 1942, at 3441. See Sen. Taft's proposed renegotiation a2en-;=ent setting up a Profits Board composed of Secretaries of War, Navy and
Treau'ry, Chairmen of M61aritime Commission and W. P. B. M8 CoNG. RE., April 6.
Z94Z at 3448.
iti.Pub. Law No. 58, 77th Cong, 2d Sess. (April 8, 194z) § 403 (b).
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a part of the regular legislative program of the Administration for the
renegotiation clause was added to the Sixth Supplemental Appropriation Act from the floor of the Senate in an obvious effort to forestall
the passage of a 6 per cernt. limitation upon war profits. The legislative chronology of the renegotiation clause clearly lends support to the
view that the Administration drafted that clause only to forestall something which it censiderzd to be less desirable.
At the time oi the passage of the Renegotiation Act there was a
clear implication that the enforcement of the renegotiation clause would
not be too severe. This will undoubtedly be true as long as the primary
objective of Administration leaders is to promote increased armament
production and as long as they believe that the profit motive is the
method most likely to further production. At the present tim: the
Administration does believe in a profit motive. This can readily be seen
from an analysis of the endless testimony of the Administration representatives appearing before various Congressional Committees. This
testimony discloses a tacit, but apparently strong, conviction that conversion from peacetime production to wartime production, that speedups and so forth can, on the whole, be best effected by increased, rather
than decreased, economic inducement. In addition, Administration
leaders have occasionally openly affirmed their-belief in the necessity
of the profit motive.
Since the passage of the Sixth Defense Appropriations Act, the
various Price Adjustment Boards have been acting pursuant to its
provisions.11 2 -These Boards are now in the process of examining the
profits of each of the thousands of firms holding a large volume of war
contracts. To do its share of the work the War Department has set
up numerous local sections throughout the country to act as the preliminary fact-finding boards. At present there appears to be a tendency
among businessmen to wait and see how this new price adjustment
machinery works. Businessmen are naturally reluctant to make voluntary reductions in their profits because of three quite natural fears.
First, the fear of higher taxes, second, the fear of reductions in their
income before taxes resulting from shortages of raw materials, and
third, the fear that they will be unable to build up reserves to reconvert
to peacetime production at the end of the war. Most businessmen feel
that one of the costs of war business is the cost of reconverting from
wartime production to peacetime pursuits and that consequently war
profits must cover this cost. Up to now the Price Adjustment Boards
have turned a deaf ear to this argument.
x12. 0. NV. L Release No. 3ta (August ig,

t942).
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WHEN ARE PROFITS "ExcEssIve"?
Late in July, 1942, the Office of War Information announced that
the experience of the Price Adjustment Boards demonstrated that the
most practical approach to profit reduction was to study a company's
overall financial position.11 3 Under this program an agreement on the
amount of excessive profit is first reached, then it is translated into the
company's contracts. When the House Naval Affairs Committee
reported that the average profit on naval contracts was 8.1 per cent.,
114
the Committee took the position that such profits were not excessive.
The Price Adjustment Boards, however, have never been willing to

approve any specific percentage.

Although these Boards have been

renegotiating contracts for about six months and they have issued a
joint statement of policy,1 15 it is impossible as yet to foretell what these
Boards will deem to be "excessive profits."
One difficulty which necessarily arises from this renegotiation is
the difficulty of determining what the statute means by "excessive
profits". The term warrants some scrutiny. The Act gives no due
to its meaning. The term "excessive profits" seems to imply the
-existence somewhere of a level of profits which would be considered
reasonable. Presumably the level of profits which would be reasonable
would vary according to differing circumstances. This adds an item
of uncertainty for each Price Adjustment Board to tackle.
From other statutes the term "excess profits" has come to have a
definite meaning. Under these statutes it means profits which exceed
a certain normal level. These statutes do not indicate, however,
whether there is intended to be some correlation between a reasonable
profit and a normal profit. Some light can be thrown on this question
by considering what are normal profits and what are excess profits.
Excess profits may in reality mean any of the following: First, the
profits earned by a particular corporation in wartime which are in
excess of normal, in the sense that they are more than what was
earned by the same corporation in time of peace; second, the profits
earned by a particular corporation represent a higher rate of return on
capital during wartime than is common to this company in time of
peace (this would be the same as the first unless new capital had been
added) ; third, the profits earned by a particular corporation represent
a higher rate of return on capital than is common to industry generally; and fourth, the profits earned by a particular corporation iepreix3. 0. W. 1. Release No. 163 (July 24, '942).
114. REPORT OF HOUSE NAVAL AFFAIRS Comm,.'nn
ON H. R. 162 (July 22,
(i42) 7.
i5. 0. W. I. Release No.32t (August 19,1942). See also War Dept. Principles
Policy and Procedure to be followed in Renegotiation (August io,1942).
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sent a higher rate of return than is generally believed to be a reasonable
rate. Of course, under the fourth definition, an excess profit is probably also an excessive profit. Because normal profits may mean- several things, the term "excess profits" is not a definite one.
The most striking instance of excess profits would, of course, be
excess in all four senses. Actually, the first and second criteria and the
third and fourth criteria mark out distinctly different fields. The first
two are taxed as excess profits by the present federal tax law. Actually they are a tax on war profits and not a tax on profits because they
are unreasonably high. During the present war this country hasn't
adopted any tax legislation based on either the third or fourth criteria.
Such a tax would more properly be described as "high profits tax"
instead of an "excess profits tax". While there is no tax statute on
these bases, it would seem that the activities of the Price Adjustment
Boards are really directed at reducing profits in line with the third and
fourth criteria. If this conclusion is correct then these Boards are really
imposing on industry a concept of what is reasonable profit. This, in
effect, would place all industries engaged in war business in a class
analogous to public utilities and would, undoubtedly, represent a step
towards the socialization of such industries.
Aside from the problem of Government control of industry, there
are a number of fundamental fallacies in a high profits tax which could
be argued on purely legal, social and economic grounds. For example,
such a tax, or action by the Board having the same result, neglects the
fact that all taxes (and all reductions in profits) are ultimately paid by
individuals and not by corporations, which are only legal entities. A
tax on a corporation in reality amounts to a tax on its shareholders.
A high profits tax on corporations discriminates between persons on a
completely illogical basis. Of course, the graduated income tax discriminates between persons but on a basis that has come to be recognized as logical.
An economic and social argument could be made that it is not reasonable or fair to confiscate by heavy taxes the wealth of corporations
without thinking of what this implies to its shareholders. Under these
circumstances it seems that the principle of taxing war profits is a more
equitable solution to the excess profits problem than the -taxing of high
profits.
If the foregoing analysis is correct, the concept of "excessive
profits" is related to a high profits tax on corporations. If such a tax
is unfair and discriminatory then in reality the concept of excessiveprofits contained in the Contract Renegotiation Statute 116 has no relax 6. Pub. Law No. 528, 77th Cong.,

2d Sess. (April 28, 1942) 1 403 (b).
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tion to the problem of excess war profits but is connected primarily
with the abstract concept of what profit a particular corporation is
entitled to earn. A grave legal question is raised by the delegation by
Congress of the determination of what constitutes an excessive profit
to any Board without any standards set to assist them in their determination. Without such definite limits or standards, the rationale used
by the Supreme Court in the Panama Refining Co.117 case in holding
the delegation of authority unconstitutional would seem to be applicable
here. Such an abdication of an essential legislative function could
hardly be justified by the fact that the renegotiation of war contracts
is closely connected to the carrying on of war. In addition, the reasoning of the Supreme Court in holding the Anti-inflation Act of World
War I unconstitutional "Is because the statute failed to set up a sufficiently definite standard, would seem to equally be applicable to this
statute.
Another effect of this compulsory renegotiation is to make a contract with the United States an obligation binding on both parties only
when it happens to result in disadvantage to the private contractor. It
makes the same contract null and void when it operates to the contractor's advantage. It is difficult in such a situation to find the mutuality of obligation which is a fundamental concept in the law of contract. Other questions as to the legality of this statute are raised by
the attempts to have it govern prior contracts, thereby apparently
depriving the contractor of property without due process of law.
There are other points on which this Renegotiation Act can be
criticized. One distressing feature of renegotiation is that it may
actually penalize a company which has co-operated Ioo per cent. by
converting to war work. Take for example the hypothetical case of two
manufacturers making the same item. After the war starts, A converts
to war work selling all his production to the Government and B takes
over the commercial trade. A is subject to renegotiation, while
B is not. Such a result hardly encourages companies to continue to
forego peacetime business if they are not prevented by priorities.
Under these circumstances renegotiation would hardly be an incentive
to increased war production. Another criticism that could be leveled
at this Act is that it provides for no court review from the Assistant
Secretary of War's ruling.
THE FUTURE OF RENEGOTIATION

The Renegotiation procedure is perhaps not with us to stay.
Senators George, Vandenburg and Danaher have flirted with the idea
117. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935).

xi.
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of having this Act amended or repealed. 119 The hearings before the
Senate Finance Committee on the Revenue Act of 1942 provided an
opportunity for many suggestions concerning renegotiation. Senator
George proposed to supplant this procedure by a percentage limitation
on war profits.' 20 This proposal was based on the theory that the profit
on war contracts should be subject to only two taxes, the first the corporate income tax, and the second a tax which would take from each
corporation all profits in excess of 5 per cent. of the gross volume of
the contract prices on fixed-price contracts and i per cent. on goods
produced on Government-owned facilities. In order to protect the
producer he was to be allowed to offset losses in one year against profits
in another year, then at the end of the war a final accounting is to
be held. After this accounting the producer is to pay over to the Government all profits in excess of 5 per cent. on the fixed-price contracts
and i per cent. on management-fee contracts for the whole war period.
If he hasn't earned that much his taxes are to be refunded by the Government in sufficient amount to equal this amount of earnings. This
suggestion and the question of repealing the Act were referred on September 22, 1942, to a special sub-committee with Senator Walsh as
Chairman. On September 29, 1942, Assistant Secretary of War Patterson appeared before this sub-committee in favor of the renogotiation procedure. 121 This sub-committee was originally to report before
the Senate had finally passed the Revenue Act so that it could be made
22
an amendment to that Bill if it was thought desirable.
Subsequently it was decided to postpone any major amendment to
the renegotiation statute as a part of the Revenue Act. As a result
none of these proposals were ever reported out by this sub-committee.
As a result of all this discussion of renegotiation two significant
amendments were made by the Revenue Act. 123 One authorized the
Price Adjustment Boards to enter into a final agreement settling a company's profits. Such agreement cannot be opened up except upon a
showing of "fraud or malfeasance or a wilful misrepresentation of a
material fact". This was a concession to industry's desire for certainty. The other clarified the inter-relation of the tax laws and refunds
resulting from renegotiation. Various other proposals for amending
the renegotiation procedure have been made.1 2 4 The. most important
1i9.
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x2,. N. Y. Sun, Sept. 12, 1942, p. x; N. Y. Times, Sept. i5,
Times, Sept z6, 1942, p. 35; Wall Street J., Oct. 1, x%2, p. 4.
121. N. Y. Woild Telegram, Sept. 29, 1942, p. 24.
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123. Revenue Act of 1942, §§ 8o, 38o6.
z4. Cf. Flynn, Cost-Plus and Red Tape Hamper War Produclon, Barron's Magazine, Aug. 3, 1942.

CONTROL OF WAR PROFITS IN THE U. S. AND CANADA

217

of these involves the suggestion that the range of profits that may be
allowed in renegotiation proceedings should be given definite percentage
limits.
It is undoubtedly too early to pass final judgment on the renegotiation procedure, but at least four things are now clear. It requires a
great deal of additional accounting. Unless the Price Adjustment
Boards are ivilling to enter into final agreements in all instances it
places businessmen in the position of never knowing when their books
are dosed and when a "profit" is actually theirs. It forces men needed
for war production to devote their time to checking over cost and profit
figures and to answering the questions of the Price Adjustment Boards.
Perhaps most serious is the fact that to the extent that these Boards
are using the percentage of profit to the gross volume of business as a
yardstick they are in effect reinstating the cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost
system of determining profits. This system was discredited in World
War I, because it not only did not contain an incentive to reduce costs,
but the only incentive present operated to increase costs as much as
possible.1 25
Certainly an end of renegotiation would accomplish two results.
It would terminate the lengthy renegotiations and it would let businessmen know just where they stand. The latter is important for though
businessmen are naturally interested in profits, it is equally true that
they are interested in certainty. As a class they want to know where
they stand and to have a fair opportunity to forecast the future. Laws
or procedures which upset business certainly are bound to have a bad
effect upon relations between Government and industry. The amendment authorizing a Price Adjustment Board to give a final certificate
subject to being reopened by the Assistant Secretary in only unusual
circumstances such as fraud or wilful misrepresentation of fact goes
a long way to solve this problem.
The Administration, however, does not rely solely on the renegotiation of war contracts in order to control war profits. It also relies
on a high excess profits tax. This program undoubtedly would adequately protect the Government against profiteering if renegotiations
were applied ruthlessly and without regard to the survival of American business. Certainly no one contests the fact that war profits must
be controlled. It is the methods which are all important. The work of
the Truman and Vincent Committees and the Price Adjustment Boards
clearly raises the question of whether the methods employed in the
United States have been as satisfactory as could have been devised. An
examination of the way in which the Dominion of Canada had handled
12s.
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this problem sheds considerable light on how this control might have
been made more satisfactory both to Government and to industry.
CANADA'S PROGRAM FOR CONTROLLING WAR PROFITS

Canada has avoided getting involved in the question of "excessive profits" by the simple expediency of planning their purchasing of
munitions and war supplies in a way which generally prevent high
profits from arising, and which encourages reductions in cost to the
Government.' 26 The tax laws are then relied upon to do the rest.
As the Dominion of Canada began to equip a modern army and
to aid the mother country, it faced the same procurement problems as
were later faced by the United States. There was the need for encouraging a rapid conversion from peacetime to wartime production. There
was a realization that war profits had to be controlled. But that is where
the similarity ceases. In the first place the internal situation in Canada
was more conducive to harmonious co-operation between the government-and industry. This rests on four facts. First,business in Canada
had no hangover of hate or distrust such as existed in some quarters
of the United States as a result of the New Deal; sccond, there are so
few producers in Canada that the Department of Munitions and Supply is familiar with each company, and can deal with them on a personal basis; third, labor was willing to forego using the war as a means
of soldifying or improving its position, and there was an absence of
jurisdictional disputes between labor groups; fourth, all prices were
rigidly fixed as of December I, 1941. (Prior to that, all contracts had
escalator clauses which caused considerable trouble.) Each of these
factors has profoundly affected the problem in Canada by simplifying
the procurement of munitions and war supplies.
Although His Majesty's Government for the Dominion of Canada
was opposed to allowing profits to be made out of the war effort, it
concluded that the profit motive was so ingrained in the Canadian way
of life that the conversion to war production and the reaching of maximum production could best be secured by allowing some profit to be
made. Its program was based on the premise that business was entitled
to a profit in converting its plants to war work. This .profit, however,
was to be a small one and generally without regard to the needs of the
company after the war. Having reached this decision, the Department
of Munitions and Supply for the Dominion of Canada was charged
with devising contracts which would insure this result. From the very
126. The author is indebted to Mr. W. J. Bennett, Executive Assistant to the Minister of Munitions and Supply, and to his associates, for information relative to the
policies and practices of the Dominion of Canada on war contracts.
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outset it adopted a program for procuring war supplies which seems to
have resulted in low prices to the Government and fair profits to the
manufacturers. In ca-rying out the Canadian Governmental policy,
the Department of Munitions and Supply studied many types of contracts. As a result of this study the Department decided that both
"cost-plus-a-fixed-fee" and "cost-plus-percentage-fee" contracts should
be used only in rare circumstances because they are extravagant and
result in high total cost to the Government. As another result of this
study a series of contracts were worked out to cover all of the various
situations.
The contracts which Canada has relied upon as safeguards against
"excessive' profits have differed, depending on the type of the commodity being purchased. Regardless of the commodity being purchased the original contract with each producer is carefully negotiated
on the basis of a careful study of costs of producing the particular
commodity in Canada and England. Only short-term contracts, rarely
running more than six months, are entered into. Government accountants are constantly auditing costs on each large contract and contracts
are only renewed on the basis of the cost experience on the previous
contract. In addition, whenever possible, contracts are drawn so as to
leave some incentive to the manufacturer for the reduction of costs.
By following this program, the Canadian Government has found that
costs to it have been kept down and "excessive" profits have resulted
in very, very few instances.
There is no Canadia n Law or Order in Council which permits or
provides for a renegotiation of contract prices or fees. Since each
contract has only a few months' duration, even a situation where
"excessive" profits might result could readily be cured without having
to set up such elaborate machinery as the Price Adjustment Boards
which have been set up in the United States. That does not mean,
however, that prices and fees have not been renegotiated or reduced.
What it does mean is that there is no board for adjusting prices whose
success may be judged by the millions of dollars that industry is
induced to turn back. In a few cases, the Department of Munitions
and Supply has called in manufacturers and suggested reductions. In
practically every instance reductions have resulted. Whenever there is
a failure to reduce the price, it is taken into consideration in awarding
the next contract.
Most Canadian war contracts cover the purchase of items of which
there was a shortage in that Dominion. From the beginning of the
War, the Department of Munitions and Supply has promoted the conversion of plants and their machinery to war uses rather than the con-
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struction of new plants which would require the purchase and manufacture of new machines and machine tools. This was a virtual necessity because of the very small machinery and machine tool industry in
Canada and of the high cost of importing machinery and tools from
the United States. Despite this policy, well over 5o per cent of Canada's war production is carried on in newly-constructed governmentowned plants.
CANADA'S

NVAR

TIME PROCUREMENT METHODS

Even during the war, Canada purchases some commodities which
were important in Canada's peacetime economy. There is generally a
surplus capacity to produce these products. This group includes most
agricultural commodities and a few manufactured products such as
lumber and cement. In the purchase of these commodities Canada follows its peacetime practice of sending out invitations to bid. The
award is then made to the lowest responsible bidder, unless in the opinion of the purchasing agent the price is too high. If it is thought to
be too high, the bids are thrown out and a readvertisement takes place.
Canadian procurement by securing competitive bids is more elastic
than in the United States. The Department of Munitions and Supply
does not have to accept the lowest bid if it doubts the ability of the
bidder to meet all the conditions of the bid or if it wastes foreign
exchange. In addition, the Department may, and often does, bargain
12 T
with the bidders.
In some instances these bids have been identical. Like most
procurement agencies, the Department of Munitions and Supply has
assumed both that the bids were arrived at by collusion and that the
prices were too high. When identical bids are received and if they are
not unreasonably high, the award is split equally between bidders at
the bid price, but each contract contains two very significant clauses.
The first clause provides for an audit of production costs and the second reserves to the Minister of Munitions and Supply the right to
reduce the contract price so that the manufacturer receives only a fair
and reasonable profit. During wartime, the reasonable profit is usually
considered to be around 5 per cent. of the cost of manufacture. The
exact percentage of profit allowed depends somewhat on the commodity
involved and the length of time it takes to produce it. There have been
a few instances where a Canadian manufacturer has refused a contract
with these two clauses. U~nder these circumstances the awards are
made to the other identical bidders.
127. PreliminaryReport of House Naal Affairs Committee pursuant to H. R. iA
(Jan. 20, 1942) 113.
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In purchasing commodities of which there is a shortage in Canada
sealed bids are not used. Different types of contracts are used in handling this situation. The purchase of large quantities of small iteni or
of fungible goods is probably the best illustration of Canada's technique
in reducing prices and eliminating the possibility of "excessive" profits.
When it came to the first purchases of a large quantity of small items,
the Department of Munitions and Supply chose those companies whose
facilities could most economically be converted to the manufacture of
each item. Each of these companies was asked to submit its estimated
cost of producing a given quantity including the conversion of its facilities so that it would, on the completion of the order, have a certain daily
capacity. Each manufacturer would bring in his costs and they would
be discussed with him, and then compared with the English cost figures.
Usually the costs would be pared down a bit and finally a number of
the manufacturers would be chosen to produce the item. As this might
take time a few of the manufacturers were usually asked or directed
to proceed to manufacture the commodity long before the contract was
worked out.
The first contract for the purchase of these types of commodities
was always a target contract. These contracts provided for a fixed
estimated cost per unit. The contract then provided for a fixed amount
of profit which usually was 5 per cent. Under the target contract,
if the cost ran over the agreed-upon estimated cost, then 25 per cent.
of this excess was taken out of the agreed-upon profit provided that in
any case 3 per cent. profit was to remain to the producer. If the actual
cost was less than the agreed-upon estimated cost, then 25 per cent. of
this saving went to the manufacturer.
These target contracts were designed for two purposes: first, to
encourage the manufacturer to make the conversion to war production
as cheaply as possible, and second, to serve as a trial run which could
be used as a costing study. Throughout the operation of this first contract the manufacturer's cost was carefully supervised by government
accountants. One way the cost was kept down on the first contract
was for ihe Department of Munitions and Supply to purchase and
supply the additional equipment needed to convert the plant. This kept
competing manufacturers from bidding up the price when trying to get
,equipment.
When the time came to enter into a second contract the manufacturer was in production and had some definite cost experience. As a
result, in all but a few instances, this second contract provided for a
fixed price based on the experience gained from the target contracL
(In a few cases, however, a new target contract was necessary.) The
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fixed price was usually based upon the estimated cost plus 5 per cent.
profit. As this was a fixed price contract it tended to encourage the
manufacturer to increase his capacity, to take short cuts, and to make
all the. savings possible. Each of these increased his profits. At the
end of this contract (which originally was to have taken six months
but was probably completed in less) a third contract was entered into
which takes into consideration the plant capacity, and the cost picture
at the close of the second contract plus profit equal to 5 per cent. of
cost. This third contract is still on a fixed price basis, as will be the
fourth, fifth, and so on. As a result the price will be a steadily descending figure providing specifications are not changed and the costs of
labor and materials do not go up.
There are many amazing results from this program. For example, the original target contract for a certain part of a shell specified a
cost of $6.5 ° plus a profit of about 30 cents. Subsequent fixed price
contracts have successively reduced the price until it is a mere 67 cents.
In this case the manufacturer is actually making a larger total profit now
than on the original contract. This has resulted from increased volume
and from improvements reducing costs by using new type machinery
and new processes and by the substitution of cheaper materials.
It will be readily appreciated that under both the target and fixedprice contracts a company going into a new line of endeavor under war
contracts will probably receive higher fees per unit of production than
a company already in the business. This is inevitable under the target
contract scheme. As the new company, however, acquires the "knowhow" during the life of successive contracts its profits and fees per
unit would normally come into line.
The Department of Munitions and Supply from its consideration
of the problem concluded that the purchase of many large items could
not be covered by a single type of contract. Therefore in the purchase
of small quantities of various large types of military equipment a number of contract forms were devised to meet each special situation.
The most important type of such contract is called the "Ceiling
Price Contract". This contract sets a ceiling price for the commodity
which is arrived at generally on estimated costs after a careful comparison with British and Canadian industrial experience. The price
ceiling also includes a profit which is figured on a percentage of these
estimated costs. This precentage is usually 5 percent. The contract,
however, calls for an audit of cost and the profit is limited to 5 per
cent. of the total cost of production. If the cost including the manufacturer's profits exceeds the ceiling price, the manufacturer is only
reimbursed up to the ceilin'g price.
-
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The Department of Munitions and Supply have recognized that
under this type of contract there is no immediate monetary incentive
for the manufacturer to reduce costs. In spite of this fact the experience in Canada has been that nearly all companies have repeatedly
reduced costs in operating under these contracts. Some incentive
results from the fact that if a manufacturer makes savings, some way
is found to give him a part of the benefit in the next contract. The
Department of Munitions and Supply has a representative, who is
familiar with production and who makes suggestions as to cost savings, in factories operating on this basis. Although there is no power
which can compel a manufacturer to adopt these suggestions (short of
a threat to cancel the contract), his cooperation is one of the factors
considered at the time of negotiating a new contract.
Another type of contract to cover small volume purchases covers
the purchase of boats. Usually the boat contracts are awarded after
sealed bids. The award goes to the lowest bidder if the bid price is not
excessive. If more than one boat is involved, other bidders are allowed
to meet the low bidder. This, of course, reduces the incentive to quote
your lowest price in the first instance. After the awards are made a
special type of contract is entered into. This contract has a price ceiling and then contains an itemized list of the major costs such as the
motor, the steel, etc. If, for example, the ship's motor is estimated to
cost $9o,ooo and it is purchased for $85,000, then the price ceiling is
reduced by $5,oo. There is no incentive in these contracts for the
manufacturer to make such savings, but the Canadian Government
assists in the purchase of the major items. The Department feels that
this procedure has accomplished the same result as incentive to the
manufacturer.
A second type of contract for small quantities of large items
is the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract. The fees run from 3 per cent. to
5 per cent. of the estimated costs. These contracts are relatively unimportant as less than 2 per cent. of all the war contracts are of this type
and they cover less than I per cent. in dollar value of purchase. One
important difference in Canada in considering the estimated cost in
fixing the fee is that cost is not interpreted to include the cost of items
furnished by the Government. In Canada this is specially significant,
for the Government manufactures many of the basic commodities used
in manufacturing military supplies and munitions and furnishes them
free of charge to all producers operating under Government contracts.
The cost-plus-a-percentage fee contract is used in a few Canadian
contracts. It is used only to purchase replacement or spare parts which
vary in quantity or specification. In this case, too, the cost includes
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only the cost reimbursable to the producer and, like the other type of
cost-plus contract, cost does not include the cost of iterm5 furnished by
the Government and the fee is invariably 5 per cent.
The final contract type results from the fact that much of Canada's production has had to be carried on in new plants constructed and
owned by the Government. Virtually all of these Government-owned
plants are operated by companies on management fee contracts. This
fee runs from a nominal amount to 3 per cent. of the estimated reimbursable cost of production. In all of these plants there are present
not only accountants but also trained Government production engineers
who check savings and costs. These contracts, nevertheless, make it
clear that the "Contractors shall have control over and be responsible
for the operation of the plant and the conduct of the worke'12
In
most contracts there is a provision which gives to the manufacturer a
part of any saving in cost which he makes.
Because of the large percentage of Government-owned plants
among the new war plants, the management fee contract is the most
important type of Canadian contract. Actually from So to 6o per
cent. of all war production is manufactured under this type. Unlike
the situation as to many new plants in the United States, the Government in Canada will continue to own these new plants after the war
except in the relatively few cases where for production reasons a new
building is constructed in the center of an existing commercial plant.
In those cases the company has the right of first refusal of any bona
fide bid price for the building with or without facilities.
There are certain provisions which are common to virtually all of
the Canadian war contracts. Thus, just as in the United States, each
of these contracts normally has a provision permitting the Minister of
Munitions and Supply to terminate or suspend a contract at will, with
or without cause. Upon such termination every effort has been made to
protect the producer for all expenditures made or obligations assumed
in good faith for performance of the contract prior to the date of its
termination. For example, His Majesty's Government must reimburse
the manufacturer for all direct expenses (including capital expenditures) to the extent that they were reasonably and properly incurred
in the performance of the contract. The inventories" of raw materials at termination are, if accumulated in good faith, proper costs
chargeable to the Government, except on some fixed-price contracts.
In all but these fixed-price contracts this problem does not arise because
all other contracts vest the title to all "materials and supplies acquired
by or in the possession of the contractor for the purposes of the work
12&

M. & S. Contract Form No. 1206.
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in His Majesty".1 29 The contractor is then made liable only for
loss of these materials and supplies resulting from "gross negligence
or wilful misconduct."
In the fixed-price contracts some relief from possible losses on
expanded inventories is given under the Tax Laws. Under these contracts, a manufacturer is permitted to set up an inventory reserve covering the normal quantity of inventory which he would have on hand
during a standard period which is usually decided to be the average of
the years z936 to 1939. The amount of this reserve is measured by the
difference in the current value of the inventory as compared with the
value of the inventory in the standard period. This amounts only to
partial protection in view of the fact that most companies have had to
expand their inventories in order to meet their war contracts and no
provision is made for any expansion in the size of the necessary inventories. Canadian companies have been able to work out exceptions to
this rule by means of special provisions in their war contracts. For
example, under one such provision the Canadian Government has obligated itself to purchase the entire output of the plant for six months
following the cessation of hostilities.
If a contract is temporarily suspended, the contractor is not entitled
to any compensation for any loss of anticipated profits-r--fees as a
result of a suspension of or decrease in the work called for by such a
contract. This same result applies if the contract is terminated, unless
it is established to the satisfaction of the Minister of Munitions and
Supply, that by reason of such action exceptional hardship has resulted
to the contractor. In those cases the Minister may, in his absolute discretion, grant a proper allowance under the circumstances. The allowance may not, however, compensate for any loss of profit.
The Department of Munitions and Supply has also set up an Appeals Committee in the Department to which any manufacturer can
appeal any decision against him resulting from the negotiation or operation of the contract. A contractor has the further right of appeal
to the Minister but in practice the Minister virtually always sustains
the Department and its Appeals Committee.
While this is the basic procedure of the Department of Munitions
and Supply, there are variations to meet special cases; in addition, there
have been a few recent changes in policy. The newest development in
the contract procedure is a contract calling for an auditing of all the
books and accounts of the company covering all the operations under
their war contracts for a period of one year or six months. The advantage of such a contract to a producer is that it eliminates losses from a
129. Ibid.
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single contract. So far a number of companies have entered into these
contracts, which, in effect, amount to a fixing of a specific fee to cover
all of a company's business for an entire year regardless of the original
contract price or fees involved. This contract produces a result similar to the Vinson Act as amended in 1936.120
These audit contracts provided that if the annual audit established
that the total profit occurring to the contractor in respect to a given
year's business is in excess of a sum equal to a definite percentage of the
cost of that part of the business "pertaining to manufacture" of the
product in the manufacturer's plant and to a lower percentage of the
cost of that part of the business pertaining to munitions of war and
war supplies manufactured in Government-owned plants, the contractor shall credit the amount of such excess to the Dominion Government. These annual audit contracts are somewhat similar to a renegotiation of war contracts. The adoption of an annual audit contract,
however, is purely voluntary and the percentage of profit is determined
by open negotiation before the contracts are completed.
A pending development in procurement procedure in Canada is
the proposal to put all of the standard contractual provisions concerning costs, termination, responsibility for claims and other general provisions in one document and have it issued as an Order in Council. It is
expected that an order to this effect will be issued some time soon. Such
an Order would have the effect of taking a large number of standard
terms out of the field of provisions which can be negotiated and they
would be bindirig equally on all contractors.
WHAT IS CosT?
Under both the Canadian and the American contract controls the

meaning of the word "cost" is very important. In this country the
War and Navy Departments in 1942 collaborated on a booklet explaining this subject.13 1 The Canadian Department of Munitions and Supply has issued a Costing Memorandum.1 3 2 This Costing Mcmorandum
was incorporated by reference in all Canadian war contracts from the
start of its program.
Generally speaking, there is considerable agreement on costing
principles used by the War and Navy Departments and Canada's Department of Munitions and Supply. In Canada cost is meant to in130. 49 STAT. 1926 (1936), 34 U. S. C. A. § 496 (Supp. 1941).
131. EXPLANATION OF PRINCIPLES FOR DETERMINATION OF COSTS UNDER GOVERN-

WENT CONTRACTS (1942)...
132. The items which are recognized as..part of cost are set forth in a Costing
Memorandum of the Department of Munitions and Supply entitled "Costing Memorandumn, M. & S.433".

CONTROL OF WAR PROFITS IN THE U. S. AND CANADA

2V

dude expenditures made by the contractor in performing the contract,
and is the sum of direct material and direct labor and a proper proportion of applicable indirect costs (including a reasonable proportion of
management expenses). In order to clarify the meaning of "cost" the
Canadian Memorandum excludes eighteen specific items.1 3
Many of the problems which arise in the United States in dealing
with the War or Navy Departments do not arise in Canada because the
Department of Munitions and Supply uses the same principles concerning allowable costs as are used by the Department of National Revenue
and the Commissioner of Income Tax. The only differences result
from adjustments which must be made in determining costs under a
single contract as compared with costs for an entire year's business.
In Canada another guarantee of similar treatment of costs results
from the fact that accountants used to supervise the war contracts for
the Department of Munitions and Supply come from the Income Tax

Office.
It is impossible in the scope of this article to make a detailed comparison of the Canadian Costing Memorandum and the U. S. Army and
Navy booklet. Both of these documents are so broad in scope as to
require numerous interpretations in their application. There are, however, one or two important differences. The Army and Navy Booklet
lists expenses due to strike and lockouts as non-reimbursable. The
Canadian practice is to allow such costs. The American Booklet
lists as non-reimbursable special legal fees for patent infringement cases.
The Canadian Costing Memorandum makes no mention of such lawsuits, but the practice is to allow such costs if they are incurred in good
faith.
133. The following items are expressly excluded by M. & S. 433:
(x) Allowances for interest on invested capital, bonds, debentures, bank
or other loans.
(2) Entertainment expenses.(3) Dues and other memberships other than regular trade associations.
(4) Donations (except as stated in Section 3, Subsection (b) hereunder).
(5) Losses on other contracts.
(6) Losses from sale or exchange of capital assets.
(7) Depreciation on buildings, machinery or equipment paid for by the
Crown.
(8) Fines and penalties.
(9) Amortization of unrealized appreciation of values of assets.
(io) Expenses, maintenance and/or depreciation of excess facilities.
(ii) Increases in reserves for contingencies, repairs, compensation insurance and guaranteed work.
(12) Federal and Provincial income, excess profits or surtaxes.
(x3) Unreasonable compensation for officers and employees.
(14) Bond discount or finance charges.
(zs) Premiums for life insurance on the lives of officers.
(i6) Legal and accounting fees in connection with reorganizations, security
issues, or capital stock issues.
(17) Losses on investments, bad debts and expenses of collection.
(18) Advertising and selling expenses.
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Another interesting and important subject is salaries and bonuses.
High salaries and bonuses are not reimbursable costs under the Army
and Navy Department cost statement. In Canada they are not listed
as being among the items which will not be reimbursed by the Canadian
Costing Memorandum. There has been a long-established practice,
however, in Canada for the Income Tax Commissioner strictly to prohibit as allowable corporate tax cost deductions large increases in salaries or bonuses. As a result, there has been a tendency in Canada for
them to be kept at a low leveL Actually any salaries or bonuses approved by the Income Tax Bureau are reimbursable costs on war contracts.
There is an interesting omission in the Canadian Costing Memorandum of any reference to conversion to war production or reconversion to peacetime pursuits. In practice the costs of conversion to war
use are invariably reimbursed as a part of the cost of the first contract.
Absolutely no provision has been made for the reconversion to peaceful
pursuits by either the Department of Munitions and Supply Costing
Memorandum or under the Canadian Tax Laws. As a matter of fact
up to the present time there has been no applications to the Department
of Munitions and Supply or the Bureau of National Revenue for the
approval of such reserves as costs. This then is a problem which both
Canadian industry and Government must face at some future time.
All in all the Canadian Costing Memorandum seems fairer and
more liberal to the manufacturer than the American Booklet. In addition its announcement at the commencement of the war program and
its administration by the Bureau of National Revenue tend to give a
certainty to the program not present under the United States program
where costs are determined by three separate agencies for the purpose
of the tax laws, to reimburse expenditures and in the renegotiation of
contracts.
One disadvantage of the Canadian system is that the determination
of allowable costs under the Canadian contracts is more complicated
than under the American cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts. This arises
from the fact that in Canada cost includes a large number of indirect
factory and miscellaneous expenses. As a result, after costs are submitted by the Canadian producer they are gone over by an Income Tax
accountant and certified to the Director of Munitions and Supply. If
the manufacturer disagrees with them as certified, he can appeal to the
Director and subsequently to the Appeals Committee and finally to the
Minister. Government officials in Canada have not hesitated to state
that they have carefully examined claims for reimbursement of indirect
costs made by any producer if there was any reason to suspect any dishonesty or lack of good faith.

CONTROL OF WAR PROFITS IN THE' U. S. AND CANADA
CANADIAN TAX LAWS

In Canada the tax laws are an integral part of the control of war
profits. At the outset of its war program the Canadian Government
believed that confiscatory "excess profits" taxes would result in discouraging conversion to war production and would result in a reduction in the incentive to keep down costs. As a result the original Canadian Excess Profits Tax was deliberately kept below Canada's financial
needs. Now that the conversion to war production has been virtually
completed and the steps taken to keep down costs have proven successful,
a new tax is before Parliament. This law proposes much higher rates of
excess profits taxes.184
In considering the tax laws of the Dominion of Canada it should
be remembered that it has largely inherited its fiscal traditions from
Great Britain. The main difference between the two tax structures is
that Canada has always placed, both in peace and in war, a greater reliance on indirect taxes. The main difference between Canadian Tax
laws and United States Tax laws is that the Canadian laws set down
broad general principles and considerable latitude is given to the Commissioner in applying them. As a result Canada has neither the detailed provisions in its Revenue Acts nor the mass of regulations that
the United States has.
The June, i94o, war budget contained the First War Tax Law.
That Act for an i8 per cent. normal corporate tax and a War Profits
Tax of r2 per cent. of the total net profit or of 75 per cent. of all net
income earned over the 1936-39 average income, whichever were the
greater.13 5 While this 75 per cent. maximum seems large, the Commissioner was given broad discretion to give relief from its operation. 1 36
This Excess Profits Tax differed from the United States Excess

Profits Tax in that it had no invested capital option. This Canadian
Tax was considerably broader in scope than Canada's World War I
Tax. It applies to all business and trade carried on in Canada whether
incorporated or not. Thus it applies to farmers' excess profits. It does
not, however, apply to incomes from certain professional occupations.
134. 92 Canadian House of Commons Debates 3901 (June 23, x942). In his Budget Message Minister of Finance, J. L. Ilsley stated: "The time has now come when iWe
can and should make the excess profits tax more severe. The rate of expansion in
business will now be much less than it has been heretofore. In the case of many
civilian businesses the volume of their production or turnover is likely to decline
rather than expand. Even in the field of- war production we are getting close to the
levels of full capacity. Consequently, businesses in general no longer need to retain
substantial amounts of their current profits for reinvestment in working capital and
can afford to pay a large proportion to the treasury."
135. Dept. of National Revenue, Excess Profits Tax,. Explanatory Brochure
(194o).
136. Dept. of National Revenue, Excess Profits Instruction Form S.P.-z.
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This 194o Tax Act set up another important part of the Canadian tax structure, i. e., the War Depreciation Board. Unlike the
cumbersome provisions for amortization of war plants and facilities
extant under the United States Tax laws the Canadian Tax Act gives
this Board a wide discretion to solve particular problems. This Board
regulates the deductions for depreciation or amortization of plant or
equipment built or purchased to fulfill war contracts, for the purposes of
both the Income and Excess Profits taxes.
This problem usually arises from the fact that some companies
have preferred to finance their own plant additions. Obviously, a building costing $5ooooo may have a peacetime value of only $200,ooo to
the manufacturer. It was to grant relief in such cases that the War
Depreciation Board was set up. This Board determines what the value
of the building will be to the producer after the war, and provides for
its depreciation to that level. In practice, Canadian industry has found
that this Board has been very liberal in its depreciation allowances; in
fact, a manufacturer is usually allowed to write his own ticket as to
the length of this period. For some reason most producers have selected
a three year period.
The 194o Tax Act also provides for a Board of Referees to set
up appropriate standards for new firms and to make arrangements for
firms or industries whose income was unduly depressed in the standard
period or companies whose capital is being impaired.1 87 Subsequent
Tax acts have continued this Board. In submitting its claims the
company can use any standard of comparison which it feels it can support.
In 1941 the Canadian Tax Law was amended. The 18 per cent.
normal corporation profits tax was retained but the excess profits tax
was to be 22 per cent. of the total profits, or 75 per cent. of the profits
in excess of the average standard profits whichever were greater. This
means that all companies had to pay in 1941 at least 4o per cent of
total profits (18 per cent. normal tax and 22 per cent excess profits
tax).
At the present time the 1942 Tax Bill is before the Canadian
Parliament.138 This bill provides for a corporate tax of 30 per cent.
on all profits and atn excess profits tax of IO per cent. of all profits, or
of ioo per cent. on all'profits in excess of the average for the standard
period, whichever tax is greater. Under this 1942 Tax Bill a company
would pay as under the 1941 Act at least 4o per cent. of total profits as
a corporation tax. Accompanying this increase in excess profits tax
I37. Dept. of National Revenue, Excess Profits Tax Explanatory Brochure
(940).
138. 92 Canadian House of Commons Debates 3912 (June 23, 1942).
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there is a provision that 20 per cent. of the excess profits tax paid
under the ioo per cent. tax is refundable without interest after the
war. It does not apply to the amount of excess profits tax paid under
the ioper cent. provision. The refundable portion of the tax paid for
income received in 1942 will be refunded not later than the end of the
second fiscal period commencing after the cessation of hostilities, and
for 1943 not later than the end of the third fiscal period.
CONCLUSION

Canada's method of controlling war profits is to negotiate contracts carefully and for a short period of time and to provide whereever possible .anincentive to the manufacturer to reduce his costs. The
tax laws are left to take care of the rest. No provision has been
made for the control of war profits by the renegotiation of war contracts. Actually, the Canadian Government feels that renegotiation
machinery is unnecessary in view of its experience during three years
of war.
The Canadian program seems to have eliminated practically all
excessive profits. At the same time it has encouraged producers to
increase capacity and make savings in costs of manufacture thereby
reducing the cost of Canada's war effort.- Actually it seems to have
done away with the necessity of renegotiating war contracts and all
the accompanying difficulties such a program entails. To these results
might be added another, namely, Canadian industry has a feeling of
certainty that seems to have resulted in virtually complete cooperation
for the purpose of winning the war.
Undoubtedly there are lessons for the United States to learn from
Canada's experience. Before any further steps to restrict profits are
taken, it would be well to remember that some forms of controlling
war profits will result and have resulted in waste, and consequently
have hampered the war effort. Perhaps the most effective way of
controlling the cost of waging the war would be the careful control of
expenditures. The experience of this country in the last war was that
the numerous methods developed to control peacetime procurement are
virtually unworkable when the premium is upon securing peak production. Perhaps there is no single solution to this problem, but certainly
a successful system will make use of every method to keep down costs
which does not interfere with the battle of production.
Some recognition of the advantages of the Canadian system of
controlling war profits by the target system of readjusting war contracts came when the War and Navy Departments presented to the
Senate Finance Committee a proposal on September 28, 1942, that the
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Renegotiation Statute be amended so that they are given clear authority to invoke this method of controlling war profits. 13 9 Certainly Canada's policy on awarding war contracts for short terms and subject to
continuous scientific cost inspection and thereafter relying on high
corporate and excess profits taxes seems better adapted to eliminate
war profits without any discouragement of production than the procedures which have been followed in the United States.
139. Wall Street J., September 2, i9A, p. S.

